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Abstract
Inspired by the local minority game, we propose a network Boolean game and inves-
tigate its dynamical properties on scale-free networks. The system can self-organize
to a stable state with better performance than random choice game, although only
the local information is available to the agent. By introducing the heterogeneity of
local interactions, we find the system has the best performance when each agent’s
interaction frequency is linear correlated with its information capacity. Generally,
the agents with more information gain more than those with less information, while
in the optimal case, each agent almost has the same average profit. In addition, we
investigate the role of irrational factor and find an interesting symmetrical behavior.
Key words: Boolean Game, Local Minority Game, Scale-Free Networks,
Self-Organization
PACS: 02.50.Le, 05.65.+b, 87.23.Ge, 89.75.Fb
1 Introduction
In recent years, the phenomena of collective behavior related to populations
of interacting individuals attract increasing attentions in the studies on sci-
entific world, especially in the economical and biological systems [1,2,3]. To
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describe and explain the self-organized phenomenon, many models are estab-
lished. Inspired by Arthur’s Farol Bar Problem [4], Challet and Zhang pro-
posed the so-called minority game (MG) [5,6], which is a simple but rich model
showing how selfish agents fight for common resources in the absence of direct
communication.
In the standard minority game, a group of N (odd) agents has to choose
between two opposing actions, which are labelled by +1 and −1 , respectively.
In the real systems of stock market, these options mean to buy stock or to sell.
Each agent is assigned a set of s strategies and informed the updated global
outcomes for the past M time steps. At each time step, they use the most
working strategies to make decisions, and those who end up in the minority
side (the side chosen by fewer agents) win and get a point. Though simple, MG
displays the self-organized global-cooperative behaviors which are ubiquitously
observed in many social and economic systems [7,8,9,10,11,12,13,14,15,16,17].
Furthermore, it can explain a large amount of empirical data and might con-
tribute to the understanding of many-body ecosystems [18,19,20].
In the real world, an individual ia able to get information from his/her
acquaintances, and try to perform optimally in his/her immediate surround-
ings. In order to add this spatial effect to the basic MG, recently, some au-
thors introduced the so-called local minority game (LMG), where agent could
make a wiser decision relying on the local information [21,22,23,24,25,26,27].
It is shown that the system could benefit from the spatial arrangement, and
achieves self-organization which is similar to the basic MG.
Denote each agent by a node, and generate a link between each pair of
agents having direct interaction, then the mutual influence can vividly be
described by means of the information networks. Accordingly, node degree k
is proportional to the quantity of information available to the corresponding
agent. Most LMG models are based on either the regular networks, or the
random ones. Nevertheless, both of them have a characterized degree, the
mean degree 〈k〉, which means each agent is almost in the same possession
of information. However, previous studies reveal that the real-life information
networks are highly heterogeneous with approximately power-law distributions
[28,29,30]. Thus the above assumption is quite improper for the reality. In
common sense, those who process huge sources of information always play
active and important roles. Therefore, in this paper, we will study the case on
the base of scale-free networks.
Another interesting issue is the herd behaviors that have been extensively
studied in Behavioral Finance and is usually considered as a crucial origin
of complexity that enhances the fluctuation and reduces the system profit
[32,33,34,35,36,37]. Here we argue that, to measure the potential occurrence
of herd behavior, it is more proper to look at how much an agent’s actions
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are determined by others (i.e. the local interaction strength of him) rather
than how much he wants to be the majority. It is because that in many real-
life situations, no matter how much the agents want to be the minority, the
herd behavior still occurs. To reveal the underlying mechanism of the herd
behavior, three questions are concerned in this paper:
a) Whether agents have different responses under the same interaction strength?
b) What are the varying trends of individual profit as the increase of inter-
action strength?
c) What are the effects of heterogenous distribution of individual herd strength
on system profit?
Furthermore, a fundamental problem in complexity science is how large sys-
tems with only local information available to the agents may become complex
through a self-organized dynamical process [31,38]. In this paper, we will also
discuss this issue based on the present model by detecting the profit-degree
correlations.
2 Model
In the present model, each agent chooses between two opposing actions at
each time step, simplified as +1 and -1. And the agents in the minority are
rewarded, thus the system profit equals to the number of winners [6,9]. At each
time step, each agent x will, at probability px, make a call to one randomly
selected neighbor to ask about this neighbor’s last action, and then decide
to choose the opposing one; or at probability 1 − px, agent x simply inherits
his previous action. Accordingly, in the former case, agent x will choose +1
at a probability
sx
−1
sx
−1
+sx
+1
, or choose -1 at a probability
sx
+1
sx
−1
+sx
+1
, where sx+1 and
sx
−1 denote the number of x’s neighbors choosing +1 and -1 in the last time
step, respectively. It is worthwhile to emphasize that the agents do not know
who are the winners in the previous steps since the global information is not
available. This is one of the main distinctions from the previously studied
LMG models.
Take the irrational factor into account [35], each agent may, at a mutation
probability m, choose an opposite action. The mutation probability adds sev-
eral impulsive and unstable ingredients to our model. Just as the saying goes,
‘nothing is fixed in the stone’, actually, people can not consider every poten-
tial possibility that would come out when making a decision. So, it is the case
that we are making the mind at this moment and changing our mind at the
next. To this extent, the introduction of the mutation parameter enriches the
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Fig. 1. (Color online) The normalized variance as a function of the average inter-
action strength p on the BA network of size 1001 and size 2001. The dashed line
represents the system profit of random game. The system performs better than the
random game when p ∈ (0, 0.28). Besides, the two curves are almost the same,
indicating the present σ
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N
− p relationship does not depend on the system size N .
model.
Considering the potential relationship between individual’s information ca-
pacity and herd strength, we assume px ∼ k
β
x , where kx is x’s degree, and β
is a free parameter. Denote p = 1
N
∑
x px the average herd strength, then one
has
px = Np
kβx
∑
y k
β
y
, (1)
where the subscript y goes over all the nodes.
There are three cases for interaction strength distributions.
a) β = 0, each agent of the network shares the same interaction strength p.
b) β > 0, heterogeneity occurs: The greater the degree, the stronger the
interaction strength, that is, hub nodes depend on the local information while
small nodes exhibit relatively independent decision making.
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Fig. 2. The agent’s winning rate versus degree. Each data point denotes one agent
and the solid line represents the average winning rate of all the agents. The cases
p = 0 and p = 1.0 correspond to the completely independent and dependent cases,
respectively; p = 0.02 is the point where the system performs best, and p = 0.28 is
another point where the system profit is equal to the random game.
c) β < 0, the heterogeneity occurs in the opposite situation: The smaller
the degree, the stronger the interaction strength, that is, hub nodes exhibit
independence while small nodes depend on the local information.
The special case with m = 0.01 and β = 0 has been previously studied to
show the effect of degree heterogeneity on the dynamical behaviors [39].
3 Simulation and Analysis
3.1 Self-organized phenomenon
In this paper, all the simulation results are averaged over 100 independent
realizations, and for each realization, the time length is T = 10000 unless
some special statement is addressed. The Baraba´si-Albert (BA) networks with
minimal degree m = 3 are used [40,41]. Initially, each node randomly choose
+1 or −1. In this subsection, we concentrate on the case β = 0 and m = 0.01.
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Fig. 3. (Color online) The normalized variance as a function of the average inter-
action strength p. The dashed line represents the system profit of random game.
The system performs better than random game when p ∈ (0, 0.2), p ∈ (0, 0.28) and
p ∈ (0, 0.34) for β = −0.25, β = 0 and β = 0.25, respectively.
The performance of the system can be measured by the variance σ2 =
(1/T )ΣTt=1(At − N/2)
2, where At is the number of agents who choose +1 at
time step t, and N denotes the network size [6,9,17]. Clearly, smaller σ2 cor-
responds to more system profit and for the completely random choice game
(random game for short), σ2 = 0.25N . Fig. 1 shows the normalized variance σ
2
N
as a function of the average interaction strength p (Since β = 0, all the nodes
have the same interaction strength p). Unexpectedly, although the global in-
formation is unavailable, the system is able to perform better than random
game in the interval p ∈ (0, 0.28). This is a strong evidence for the existence
of self-organized process. In addition, we attain that the network size effect is
very slight for sufficient N (N ∼ 103), thus hereinafter, only the case N = 1001
is investigated.
In Fig. 2, we report the agent’s winning rate versus degree, where the winning
rate is denoted by the average score 〈s〉 during one time step. Obviously, unless
the two extreme points p = 0 and p = 1, there is a positive correlation between
the agent’s profit and degree, which means the agents of larger degree will
perform better than those of less degree. If the agents choosing +1 and −1 are
equally mixed up in the network, there is no correlation between profit and
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degree [39]. Therefore, this positive correlation provides another evidence of
the existence of a self-organized process.
3.2 Effect of interaction strength heterogeneity on system profit
In this subsection, we investigate how β affects the system profit with mu-
tation probability m = 0.01 fixed.
In Fig. 3, it is observed that in all the three cases β = −0.25, β = 0, and
β = 0.25, the system performs more efficiently than the random choice game
when p is at a certain interval. More interesting, when the interaction strength
p is small (p < 0.5), the system with positive β (β = 0.25) performs best, while
for large p (p > 0.5), the system with negative β (β = −0.25) performs best.
However, this phenomenon does not hold if |β| is too large (β ∼= 1).
We have checked that for all the cases with β ∈ (−1, 1), all the systems
achieve their own optimal state at the interval p ∈ [0.02, 0.1]. When given
p, it is natural to question whether there exists an optimal β, in which the
system performs best. We report the normalized variance as a function of β for
different p in figure 4. Remarkably, all the optimal states are achieved around
β = 1. Besides, it is worthwhile to attach significant importance to the case
when β = 1 and p = 0.08, when we have the most profitable system.
The interaction strength heterogeneity can have some positive effects on
system as a whole, including better use of the information and more profit. We
wonder which group of people profit after all? Specifically, figure 5 shows the
agent’s winning rate versus degree for β = −0.25, 0 and 1, where p = 0.08 is
fixed. Unexpectedly, in the most optimal system (i.e. β = 1 and p = 0.08), the
profit-degree correlation vanishes. So one may draw an interesting conclusion
that the great disparity between poor and rich population is not the necessary
condition for an efficient social. However, we can not give an analytical solution
about this phenomenon, and the corresponding conclusion may be only valid
for this special model.
3.3 Role of irrational factor
Figure 6 reports the normalized variance as a function of the mutation prob-
ability m. Interestingly, the curves display symmetry with a dividing point
m = 0.5 at which each system has the same profit as the random game. For
arbitrary agent, denote sa the number of this agent’s neighbors choosing a in
the present time step, and p(a,b) the probability he/she will choose b in the
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Fig. 4. (Color online) the normalized variance as a function of the interaction power
β for several selected p indicated in the inset. Evidently, the system tends to perform
optimally when the interaction power β is around 1.
next time step under the condition that he/she chooses a in the present time
step. Clearly, one has
p(+1,+1) =
(1−m)p · s
−1
s
−1 + s+1
+
m · p · s+1
s+1 + s−1
+ (1−m)(1− p) (2)
p(+1,−1) =
(1−m)p · s+1
s
−1 + s+1
+
m · p · s
−1
s+1 + s−1
+m(1− p) (3)
p(−1,+1) =
(1−m)p · s
−1
s
−1 + s+1
+
m · p · s+1
s+1 + s−1
+m(1− p) (4)
p(−1,−1) =
(1−m)p · s+1
s
−1 + s+1
+
m · p · s
−1
s+1 + s−1
+ (1−m)(1− p) (5)
If m = 0.5, p(+1,+1) = p(+1,−1) = p(−1,+1) = p(−1,−1) = 0.5 (the same as that
of the random game), thus σ2/N = 0.25 (independent of p). Additionally,
replace m by 1−m, one will immediately find the symmetry.
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Fig. 5. (Color online) The agent’s winning rate versus degree, where each data point
corresponds to one agent. The black squares, red circles and green triangles denote
the case β = −0.25, β = 0 and β = 1, respectively.
4 Conclusion
In summary, inspired by the local minority game, we propose a network
Boolean game. The simulation results upon the scale-free network are shown.
The system can self-organize to a stable state with a better performance than
the random choice game, although only the local information is available to
the agent. This is a reasonable evidence of the existence of a self-organized
process. We find remarkable differences between the case with local interac-
tion strengths identical for all agents (β = 0), and that with local interaction
strengths unequally distributed to the agents. The interval of p, within which
the system can perform better than the random game, is obviously extended
in the case when β > 0. In addition, the system reaches the best performance
when each agent’s interaction frequency is linear correlated with its informa-
tion capacity. Generally, the agents with more information gain more, however,
in the optimal case, each agent has almost the same average profit. Within
the frame of this model, the great disparity between poor and rich population
is not the necessary condition for an efficient social. The effect of irrational
factor on the dynamics of this model is also investigated, and an interesting
symmetrical behavior is found.
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Fig. 6. (Color online) The normalized variance as a function of the mutation proba-
bility m for several selected p. The parameter β = 0 is fixed. Obviously, the curves
exhibit symmetry with a dividing point m = 0.5. When m = 0.5, every system has
the same profit as the random game though different p. The shapes of these curves
vary as p increases: For small p, the curves have the peculiar “two-winged” shape,
while for large p, the curves become U-shaped. The cases for p > 0.5 have very large
σ2/N when m is close to 0 or 1, thus not shown here.
Although is rough, the model offers a simple and intuitive paradigm of many-
body systems that can self-organize even when only local information is avail-
able. Since the self-organized process is considered as one of the key ingredients
of the origins of complexity, hopefully, the model as well as its perspectives
and conclusions might contribute to the achievement of the underlying mech-
anism of the complex systems. Furthermore, using the method proposed by
Challet, Marsili, and Zhang [42,43,44], the market price can be introduced to
the present model by define the price return proportional to the difference
between the numbers of agents choosing +1 and −1. In this sense, one is able
to check if this model can display stylized facts in accordance with the real
markets.
Finally, we would like to point out that to set some kinds of action strength
correlated with the degree of corresponding node in a power-law form (e.g.
px ∼ k
β
x) to better the system performance is not only available in this partic-
ular issue, but also a widely used approach for many dynamics upon scale-free
networks, such as to fasten searching engine [45] and broadcasting process [46],
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to enhance network synchronizability [47], to improve traffic capacity [48], and
so on. We believe this method can also be applied to the studies on many other
network dynamical processes.
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